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Aircraft
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Aircraft Systems
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Flight Instruments
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Navigation |
Procedures and Airport Operations |
| Regulations | Weather | Weather Services | First Aid & Physiology |
Airport traffic control towers are established to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic. The tower controller will issue instructions for aircraft to follow the desired flight path while in the airport traffic area whenever necessary by using terminology as shown in Figure 5-1.
The tower controller will also direct aircraft taxiing on the surface movement area of the airport. In all instances, an appropriate clearance must be received from the tower before taking off or landing.
At airports without an operating control tower, pilots of fixed-wing and weight-shift control aircraft must circle the airport to the left (“left traffic”) unless visual indicators indicate right traffic.
A common visual indicator is the segmented circle system, which consists of the following components.
• The segmented circle is located in a position readily visible to pilots in the air and on the ground.
• A tetrahedron may be used to indicate the direction of landings and takeoffs. The small end of the tetrahedron points in the direction of landing. Pilots are cautioned against using the tetrahedron to determine wind direction, because it may not indicate the correct direction in light winds.
• A wind cone, wind sock, or wind tee may be installed near the operational runway to indicate wind direction. The large end of the wind cone or sock points into the wind as does the cross bar of the wind tee.
The tetrahedron, wind cone, wind sock, or wind tee may be located in the center of the segmented circle and may be lit for night operations.
Landing runway (landing strip) indicators are installed in pairs and used to show alignment of runways.
Traffic pattern indicators are installed in pairs in conjunction with landing strip indicators, and are used to indicate the direction of turns.
Approaching to land at an airport without a control tower, or when the control tower is not in operation, the pilot should observe the indicator for the approach end of the runway to be used. VFR landings at night should be made the same as during daytime.
Aircraft departing an uncontrolled airport must comply with any FAA traffic pattern established for that airport.
Runway numbers and letters are determined from the approach direction. The number is the magnetic heading of the runway rounded to the nearest 10°. For example, an azimuth of 183° would result in a runway number of 18; a magnetic azimuth of 076° would result in a runway numbered 8. Runway letters differentiate between left (L), right (R), or center (C).
The designated beginning of the runway that is available and suitable for the landing of aircraft is called the threshold . A threshold that is not at the beginning of the full-strength runway pavement is a displaced threshold. The paved area behind the displaced threshold is marked by arrows and is available for taxiing, takeoff, and landing rollout, but is not to be used for landing, usually because of an obstruction in the approach path.
Stopways are found extending beyond some usable runways. These areas are marked by chevrons, and while they appear usable, they are suitable only as overrun areas.
A closed runway which is unusable and may be hazardous, even though it may appear usable, will be marked by an “X.”
LAHSO is an acronym for “Land And Hold Short Operations.” These operations include landing and holding short of an intersecting runway, an intersecting taxiway, or some other designated point on a runway other than an intersecting runway or taxiway. LAHSO is an air traffic control procedure that requires pilot participation to balance the needs for increased airport capacity and system efficiency, consistent with safety. Student pilots or pilots not familiar with LAHSO should not participate in the program. The PIC has the final authority to accept or decline any land and hold short clearance. The safety and operation of the aircraft remain the responsibility of the pilot. Pilots are expected to decline a LAHSO clearance if they determine it will compromise safety. Available Landing Distance (ALD) data is published in the special notices section of the Chart Supplements U.S. and in the U.S. Terminal Procedures Publications. Pilots should only receive a LAHSO clearance when there is a minimum ceiling of 1,000 feet and 3 statute miles visibility. The intent of having “basic” VFR weather conditions is to allow pilots to maintain visual contact with other aircraft and ground vehicle operations.
A is a taxiway/runway hold position sign.
B is a runway approach hold position sign.
C is an ILS critical area hold position sign.
D is a no entry sign.
E is a taxiway location sign.
F is a runway location sign.
G is a runway safety area/obstacle free zone boundary.
H is an ILS critical area boundary.
I is an inbound destination sign.
J is an outbound destination sign.
K is a taxiway direction sign.
L is a runway distance remaining (in 1,000 foot increments).
M is a runway/runway hold position sign.
N is a taxiway ending marker.
A closed runway which is unusable and may be hazardous, even though it may appear usable, will be marked by an “X.”
At night, the location of an airport can be determined by the presence of an airport rotating beacon light. The colors and color combinations that denote the type of airports are:
*Note: Green alone or amber alone is used only in connection with a white-and-green or white-and-amber beacon display, respectively.
A civil lighted land airport beacon will show alternating white and green flashes. A military airfield will be identified by dual-peaked (two quick) white flashes between green flashes.
In Class B, C, D, or E airspace, operation of the airport beacon during the hours of daylight often indicates the ceiling is less than 1,000 feet and/or the visibility is less than 3 miles. However, pilots should not rely solely on the operation of the airport beacon to indicate if weather conditions are IFR or VFR.
Runway edge lights are used to outline the runway at night or during periods of low visibility. For the most part, runway edge lights are white, and may be high-, medium-, or low-intensity, while taxiways are outlined by blue omnidirectional lights.
Radio control of lighting is available at some airports, providing airborne control of lights by keying the aircraft’s microphone. The control system is responsive to 7, 5, or 3 microphone clicks. Keying the microphone seven times within 5 seconds will turn the lighting to its highest intensity; five times in 5 seconds will set the lights to medium intensity; low intensity is set by keying three times in 5 seconds.
The visual approach slope indicator (VASI) is a lighting system arranged so as to provide visual-descent guidance information during approach to a runway. The lights are visible for up to 5 miles during the day. The VASI glide path provides obstruction clearance, while lateral guidance is provided by the runway or runway lights. When operating to an airport with an operating control tower, the pilot of an airplane approaching to land on a runway served by a VASI is required to maintain an altitude at or above the glide slope until a lower altitude is necessary for landing.
Most VASI installations consist of two bars, near and far, which provide one visual glide path. On final approach flying toward the runway of intended landing, if the pilot sees both bars as red, the aircraft is below the glide path (Figure 5-8A). Maintaining altitude, the pilot will see the near bar turn pink and then white, while the far bar remains red, indicating the glide path is being intercepted. If the aircraft is above the glide path, the pilot will see both near and far bars as white
Pulsating VASIs normally consist of a single light unit projecting a two-color visual approach path. The below-glide-path indication is normally red or pulsating red, and the above-glide-path indication is normally pulsating white. The on-glide-path indication is usually steady white.
The precision approach path indicator (PAPI) uses a single row of lights. Four white lights means “too high.” One red light and three white lights means “slightly high,” etc. S
Taxiing to or from the runway generally presents no problems during calm or light wind conditions. However, when taxiing in moderate to strong wind conditions, the airplane’s control surfaces must be used to counteract the effects of wind. In airplanes equipped with a nose wheel (tricycle-gear), use the following taxi procedures:
1. The elevator should be in the neutral position when taxiing into a headwind.
2. The upwind aileron should be held in the up position when taxiing in a crosswind (or the upwind wing will tend to be lifted).
3. The elevator should be held in the down position and the upwind aileron down when taxiing with a quartering tailwind (the most critical condition for a nosewheel-type airplane).
When an airplane equipped with a tailwheel is taxied into a headwind, the elevator should be held in the up position to hold the tail down. In a quartering tailwind, both the upwind aileron and the elevator should be in the down position.
The Chart Supplements U.S. is a publication designed primarily as a pilot’s operational manual containing all airports, seaplane bases, and heliports open to the public including communications data, navigational facilities, and certain special notices and procedures. Directories are reissued in their entirety every 56 days.
Because of the wealth of information provided, an extensive legend is required for the Chart Supplements Airport/Facility section.
Pilot performance can be seriously degraded by a number of physiological factors. While some of the factors may be beyond the control of the pilot, awareness of cause and effect can help minimize any adverse effects.
Hypoxia, a state of oxygen deficiency, impairs functions of the brain and other organs. Headache, drowsiness, dizziness, and euphoria are all symptoms of hypoxia.
For optimum protection, pilots should avoid flying above 10,000 feet MSL for prolonged periods without using supplemental oxygen. Federal Aviation Regulations require that when operating an aircraft at cabin pressure altitudes above 12,500 feet MSL up to and including 14,000 feet MSL, supplemental oxygen shall be used by the minimum flight crew during that time in excess of 30 minutes at those altitudes. Every occupant of the aircraft must be provided with supplemental oxygen above 15,000 feet.
Aviatior’s breathing oxygen should be used to replenish an aircraft oxygen system for high-altitude flight. Oxygen used for medical purposes or welding normally should not be used because it may contain too much water. The excess water could condense and freeze in oxygen lines when flying at high altitudes and could block oxygen flow. Constant use of oxygen containing too much water may also cause corrosion in the system. Specifications for aviator’s breathing oxygen are 99.5% pure oxygen and not more than .005 mg of water per liter of oxygen.
Hyperventilation, a deficiency of carbon dioxide within the body, can be the result of rapid or extra deep breathing due to emotional tension, anxiety, or fear. Symptoms will subside after the rate and depth of breathing are brought under control. A pilot should be able to overcome the symptoms or avoid future occurrences of hyperventilation by talking aloud, breathing into a bag, or slowing the breathing rate.
Carbon monoxide is a colorless, odorless, and tasteless gas contained in exhaust fumes. Symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning include headache, drowsiness, or dizziness. Large accumulations of carbon monoxide in the human body result in a loss of muscular power. Susceptibility increases as altitude increases.
A pilot who detects symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning should immediately shut off the heater and open air vents.
Various complex motions, forces, and visual scenes encountered in flight may result in misleading information being sent to the brain by various sensory organs. Spatial disorientation may result if these body signals are used to interpret flight attitude. The best way to overcome spatial disorientation is by relying on the flight instruments rather than taking a chance on the sensory organs. Weight-shift control and powered parachutes can use the compass heading as an instrument indication.
The pilot is responsible for determining if they are fit to fly for a particular flight. Most preventable accidents have one common factor: human error, rather than a mechanical malfunction. Good ADM is necessary to prevent human error. ADM is a systematic approach to the mental process used by aircraft pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set of circumstances.
The ADM process addresses all aspects of decision making in the cockpit and identifies the steps involved in good decision making. Steps for good decision making are:
1. Identifying personal attitudes hazardous to safe flight.
2. Learning behavior modification techniques.
3. Learning how to recognize and cope with stress.
4. Developing risk assessment skills.
5. Using all resources in a multicrew situation.
6. Evaluating the effectiveness of one’s ADM skills.
There are a number of classic behavioral traps into which pilots have been known to fall. Pilots, particularly those with considerable experience, as a rule always try to complete a flight as planned, please passengers, meet schedules, and generally demonstrate that they have the “right stuff.” These tendencies ultimately may lead to practices that are dangerous and often illegal, and may lead to a mishap. All experienced pilots have fallen prey to, or have been tempted by, one or more of these tendencies in their flying careers. These dangerous tendencies or behavior patterns, which must be identified and eliminated, include:
• Peer pressure. Poor decision making based upon emotional response to peers rather than evaluating a situation objectively.
• Mind set. The inability to recognize and cope with changes in the situation different from those anticipated or planned.
• Get-there-itis. This tendency, common among pilots, clouds the vision and impairs judgment by causing a fixation on the original goal or destination combined with a total disregard for any alternative course of action.
• Duck-under syndrome. The tendency to sneak a peek by descending below minimums during an approach. Based on a belief that there is always a built-in “fudge” factor that can be used or on an unwillingness to admit defeat and shoot a missed approach.
• Scud running. Pushing the capabilities of the pilot and the aircraft to the limits by trying to maintain visual contact with the terrain while trying to avoid physical contact with it. This attitude is characterized by the old pilot’s joke: “If it’s too bad to go IFR, we’ll go VFR.”
• Continuing VFR flight into IMC. Can lead to spatial disorientation or collision with ground/obstacles. It is even more dangerous if the pilot is not instrument qualified or current.
• Getting behind the aircraft. Allowing events or the situation to control your actions rather than the other way around. Characterized by a constant state of surprise at what happens next.
• Loss of positional or situation awareness. Another case of getting behind the aircraft which results in not knowing where you are, an inability to recognize deteriorating circumstances, and/or the misjudgment of the rate of deterioration.
• Operating without adequate fuel reserves. Ignoring minimum fuel reserve requirements, either VFR or IFR, is generally the result of overconfidence, lack of flight planning, or ignoring the regulations.
• Descent below the minimum enroute altitude. Duck-under syndrome manifesting itself during the enroute portion of an IFR flight.
• Flying outside the envelope. Unjustified reliance on the (usually mistaken) belief that the aircraft’s high performance capability meets the demands imposed by the pilot’s (usually overestimated) flying skills.
• Neglect of flight planning, preflight inspections, checklists, etc. Unjustified reliance on the pilot’s short- and long-term memory, regular flying skills, repetitive and familiar routes, etc.
Each ADM student should take the Self-Assessment Hazardous Attitude Inventory Test in order to gain a realistic perspective on their own attitudes toward flying. The test requires the pilot to provide a response which most accurately reflects the reasoning behind their decision. The pilot must choose one of the five given reasons for making that decision, even though the pilot may not consider any of the five choices acceptable. The test presents extreme cases of incorrect pilot decision making in an effort to introduce the five types of hazardous attitudes.
ADM addresses the following five hazardous attitudes:
1. Anti-authority (don’t tell me!). This attitude is found in people who do not like anyone telling them what to do. In a sense they are saying “no one can tell me what to do.” They may be resentful of having someone tell them what to do or may regard rules, regulations, and procedures as silly or unnecessary. However, it is always your prerogative to question authority if you feel it is in error. The antidote for this attitude is: “Follow the rules. They are usually right.”
2. Impulsivity (do something quickly!). is the attitude of people who frequently feel the need to do something—anything—immediately. They do not stop to think about what they are about to do, they do not select the best alternative, and they do the first thing that comes to mind. The antidote for this attitude is: “Not so fast. Think first.”
3. Invulnerability (it won’t happen to me). Many people feel that accidents happen to others, but never to them. They know accidents can happen, and they know that anyone can be affected. They never really feel or believe that they will be personally involved. Pilots who think this way are more likely to take chances and increase risk. The antidote for this attitude is: “It could happen to me.”
4. Macho (I can do it). Pilots who are always trying to prove that they are better than anyone else are thinking “I can do it—I’ll show them.” Pilots with this type of attitude will try to prove themselves by taking risks in order to impress others. While this pattern is thought to be a male characteristic, women are equally susceptible. The antidote for this attitude is: “Taking chances is foolish.”
5. Resignation (what’s the use?). Pilots who think “what’s the use?” do not see themselves as being able to make a great deal of difference in what happens to them. When things go well, the pilot is apt to think that’s good luck. When things go badly, the pilot may feel that “someone is out to get me,” or attribute it to bad luck. The pilot will leave the action to others, for better or worse. Sometimes, such pilots will even go along with unreasonable requests just to be a “nice guy.” The antidote for this attitude is: “I’m not helpless. I can make a difference.”
Hazardous attitudes which contribute to poor pilot judgment can be effectively counteracted by redirecting that hazardous attitude so that appropriate action can be taken. Recognition of hazardous thoughts is the first step in neutralizing them in the ADM process. Pilots should become familiar with a means of counteracting hazardous attitudes with an appropriate antidote thought. When a pilot recognizes a thought as hazardous, the pilot should correct that thought by stating the corresponding antidote.
If you hope to succeed at reducing stress associated with crisis management in the air or with your job, it is essential to begin by making a personal assessment of stress in all areas of your life. Good cockpit stress management begins with good life stress management. Many of the stress coping techniques practiced for life stress management are not usually practical in flight. Rather, you must condition yourself to relax and think rationally when stress appears. The following checklist outlines some thoughts on cockpit stress management.
1. Avoid situations that distract you from flying the aircraft.
2. Reduce your workload to reduce stress levels. This will create a proper environment in which to make good decisions.
3. If an emergency does occur, be calm. Think for a moment, weigh the alternatives, then act.
4. Maintain proficiency in your aircraft; proficiency builds confidence. Familiarize yourself thoroughly with your aircraft, its systems, and emergency procedures.
5. Know and respect your own personal limits.
6. Do not let little mistakes bother you until they build into a big thing. Wait until after you land, then debrief and analyze past actions.
7. If flying is adding to your stress, either stop flying or seek professional help to manage your stress within acceptable limits.
The DECIDE model, comprised of a six-step process, is intended to provide the pilot with a logical way of approaching decision making. The six elements of the DECIDE model represent a continuous loop decision process which can be used to assist a pilot in the decision making process when they are faced with a change in a situation that requires a judgment. This DECIDE model is primarily focused on the intellectual component, but can have an impact on the motivational component of judgment as well. If a pilot practices the DECIDE model in all decision making, its use can become very natural and could result in better decisions being made under all types of situations.
1. Detect. The decision maker detects the fact that change has occurred.
2. Estimate. The decision maker estimates the need to counter or react to the change.
3. Choose. The decision maker chooses a desirable outcome (in terms of success) for the flight.
4. Identify. The decision maker identifies actions which could successfully control the change.
5. Do. The decision maker takes the necessary action.
6. Evaluate. The decision maker evaluates the effect(s) of their action countering the change.
Vision is the most important body sense for safe flight. Major factors that determine how effectively vision can be used are the level of illumination and the technique of scanning the sky for other aircraft.
Atmospheric haze reduces the ability to see traffic or terrain during flight, making all features appear to be farther away than they actually are.
In preparation for a night flight, the pilot should avoid bright white lights for at least 30 minutes before the flight.
Scanning the sky for other aircraft is a key factor in collision avoidance. Pilots must develop an effective scanning technique which maximizes visual capabilities. Because the eyes focus only on a narrow viewing area, effective scanning is accomplished with a series of short, regularly spaced eye movements. Each movement should not exceed 10°, and each area should be observed for at least one second. At night, scan slowly to permit the use of off-center vision.
Prior to starting any maneuver, a pilot should visually scan the entire area for collision avoidance. Any aircraft that appears to have no relative motion and stays in one scan quadrant is likely to be on a collision course. If a target shows neither lateral nor vertical motion, but increases in size, take evasive action.
When climbing or descending VFR on an airway, execute gentle banks, right and left, to provide for visual scanning of the airspace.
When an aircraft is being operated during the period from sunset to sunrise (except in Alaska), it must display lighted position lights and an anti-collision light. The anti-collision light may be either aviation red or aviation white.
For collision avoidance, a pilot must know where each colored light is located on an aircraft. For example, if a pilot observes a steady red light and a flashing red light ahead and at the same altitude, the other aircraft is crossing to the left; a steady white and a flashing red light indicates that the other aircraft is headed away from the observer; and steady red and green lights at the same altitude as the observer indicates that the other aircraft is approaching head-on.
Controllers are required to separate small aircraft that are
departing from an intersection on the same runway behind a large aircraft by
ensuring that at least a 3−minute interval exists between the time the preceding
large aircraft has taken off and the succeeding small aircraft begins takeoff
roll. controller will state:
“Hold for wake turbulence.”
AIM 4−3−10.
Intersection Takeoffs: If after considering wake turbulence hazards, the pilot
feels that a lesser time interval is appropriate, the pilot may request a waiver
to the 3−minute interval. To initiate such a request, simply say “Request waiver
to 3−minute interval” or a similar statement.
Severe Turbulence: This type of turbulence causes large, abrupt changes in altitude and/or attitude usually accompanied by large variations in indicated airspeed. Aircraft may be momentarily out of control. AIM 4−6−6. Severe turbulence causes large, abrupt changes in altitude and/or attitude usually accompanied by large variations in indicated airspeed. Aircraft may be momentarily out of control. Encounters with severe turbulence must be remedied immediately in any phase of flight.
Pilots should report good weather as well as bad, and confirm expected conditions as well as unexpected. Remember that weather conditions can change rapidly and that a “go or no go” decision, as mentioned in AIM paragraph 7−1−4b2, should be assessed at all phases of flight.
ATC radar is not able to detect turbulence. Generally, turbulence can be expected to occur as the rate of rainfall or intensity of precipitation increases.